Background: Australia is currently in the process of deploying a national personally controlled electronic health record (PCEHR). This is being built using a combination of international standards and proles as well as Australian Standards and with specications developed by the National eHealth Transition Authority (NeHTA). Objective: There exists a poor appreciation of how the complex construction of the overall system is supported and protected by multiple international standards. These fundamental underpinnings have been sourced from international standards groups such as Health Level Seven (HL7) and Integrating the Health Enterprise (IHE) as well as developed locally. In addition, other services underlie this infrastructure such as secure messaging, the national Health Identication Service and the National Authentication Service for Health (NASH). Methods: An analysis of the national e-health system demonstrates how this model of standards and service integration results in a complex service oriented architecture. Results: The expected benets from the integrated yet highly dependent nature of the national ehealth system are improved patient outcomes and signicant cost savings. These are grounded and balanced by the current and future challenges that include incorporating the PCEHR into clincial workows and ensuring relevant, timely, detailed clinical data as well as consistent security policy issues and unquantied security threats. Conclusions: Ultimately, Australia has designed an ambitious yet diverse and integrated architecture. What remains to be seen is if the challenges that the medical software industry and clinical community face in leveraging the political process in order to encourage provider and public participation in ehealth, can be achieved despite the sound underpinnings of international standards.
This impact of these factors on the applications and software used to delivery and support ehealth is that there is an inimitable complexity of data and documentation, and a labyrinth of data requirements across a distributed system. The distribution is not merely in location but of time and person given the dispersed web of healthcare providers. This environment requires a complex construction of governance because of the public (40%) and private (60%) split in service delivery and due to its multi-tiered, distributed arrangement. This governance structure creates a disjunction between costs and benets. The electronic age where information, both good and bad, is not in short supply, demands a medico-legal practice of defensive medicine, in addition to the primary prerequisite of medical practice to`rst do no harm'. The need to tame this clinical information tsunami means it is increasingly important to provide eective and readily adoptable clinical decision support. The relevance of these factors to the development of software applications, services, and the supporting information exchange architecture [1] means that developers are wading into a highly complex and contextualised environment. This situation is further complicated by the consideration of privacy and security [2] and the sensitivity about government concentration of personal information.
This paper explores the complex underpinnings of Australia's national ehealth system and the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR). The basis for using standards and their impact is discussed to preface the analysis of the challenges that such a national system presents to those who have to deliver it the software industry; those who are to use it -the clinical community; and those who are the consumers of it -the public, and how these challenges create tensions despite the sound foundations that the system is built upon.
1.1
Background to the Personally
Controlled Electronic Health Record
Australia, like many countries, is facing increasing challenges in delivering high quality healthcare to an aging population and increases in chronic disease whilst attempting to control spiralling costs [3] . As part of Australia's national health reform Australia is introducing a Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) [4, 5] . The PCEHR is a primary constituent of the national health reform agenda and as such has been the focus of the development of Australia's ehealth architecture [6] .
The PCEHR aims to place the individual at the centre of their own healthcare by enabling access to important pieces of health information when and where it is needed by individuals and their healthcare providers [7] .
In the Australian healthcare environment there are a number of complementary bodies involved in and impacting the development of the national ehealth system as shown in Figure 1 . The use of standards, not to be confused with standardisation, is to facilitate the eective interoperability in communications. One of the underlying drivers for creating uniformity through standards is to address the issues of safety and quality which is of particular importance in the healthcare application environment. Further, standards in software development are benecial in the ability to reuse specications from consistent, expert evaluated documentation. Informed, independent and objective professional review also contributes to increased clarity of requirements specication [11] . Further, it contributes to lowering integration costs, fosters vendor innovation and competition with no specic vendor lock-in for users, which are all important factors in the development of a nationwide interoperable system in Australia's free market economy. These are all benets of using local and international standards where multiple but integrated services are required. This also fosters an independent plug and play approach to software and service integration a goal of services oriented architecture (SOA).
Designs of formal electronic health records have focused on the integration of intra-enterprise applications.
This severely limits the scalability and interoperability required for distributed systems [12] . Thus the move to SOA is attractive, although complex and a major challenge to design on a national scale. There are examples of SOA designs at an organizational level, but few at levels wider than this. What SOA potentially provides is an overarching architectural framework which allows the functionality of multiple competing but complementary services to be brought together. The reuse and enterprise application integration is an attractive proposition supporting modularity and interoperability, using services as the building blocks for development of exible but reliable system components [13] . In addition, SOA can forge a pathway for migration from legacy systems as it permits software solutions at dierent levels of technical maturity to eectively interoperate.
The Australian Experience
As has been shown in other countries, the challenge is to integrate standards nationally and internationally that support the needs of the environment to which they are applied [14] . In order to avoid the case where propri- ularly pertinent to the healthcare environment as SOA addresses some of the common problems that healthcare computing faces in a complex work environment with a need for legacy system re-use, and requiring linkage of multiple interfacing systems [18] . Of concern is that in any electronic records system it is the control of all information, but particularly sensitive and patient condential healthcare data that needs protection. The manner that this is dealt with from a security perspective is through established security policy. This requires that all participants in the information sharing domain in question must have methods of informing each other of their respective policy and ensure they are consistent [19] . This extends further than just trusted end-to-end communication. Privacy of information has been, and is, a major issue for all countries in developing shared healthcare data systems [20] . Whilst there exists a National Ehealth Security and Access Framework (NESAF) [21] intended to provide an overall architectural solution for security, it is the application of this aspect that is currently unclear in Australia's deployment. The NESAF itself is based primarily and extensively on ISO standards and whilst still under development themselves, refers to the HL7 PASS and SAIF frameworks [22] . to launch. There is considerable pressure to realise return on investment as despite being a national initiative, the majority of the software industry is not being funded to implement the attached systems. Given the changes, delay in some specications and lack of budget for long term development of specications, the scope has now been so constrained and it may prove dicult to make a sustainable business case for implementation for many vendors in the short or medium term.
One signicant issue that has arisen is that some standards have been varied during implementation. For instance, the HL7 CDA standards have been extended, the impact of which is that the standard tools and testing methodologies do not work with the NeHTA versions.
The IHE XDS payload and XML packaging have been altered from the international prole. The security in the PCEHR has not been disclosed other than in the broadest terms. There are issues of late modications to both the PCEHR electronic (B2B) interface and content specications which will ensure that implementation will take time once the specications are available, correct and stable. Lastly, the delivery of associated but fundamental services, for instance the NASH, has been delayed, and now is only due for delivery sometime after the 1 July PCEHR launch date, necessitating the adoption of interim security arrangements which have recieved little external scutiny.
It is very dicult to retrot security and there is no infor- 
Conclusions
The development of a service oriented architectural solution on a national basis is ambitious yet necessary. The successful deployment of a national health records system, regardless of any technological issues, is dependent ultimately on the user acceptance and use. Putting the legal, workow and security barriers aside, the standardisation of healthcare information (yes more standards) is a key element to its adoption.
The initial facilities will be basic and any uptake will be dependent on funding to extend and prove the system. This is likely to take a signicant time and in the current political environment may not even be possible. Of greater concern is the lack of a live test environment, similar to a live deployment but with populated dummy data with which to test the security, access and performance.
Any large implementation that has a high reliance on and integration of security services, as the Australian national ehealth system undoubtedly has, should have a coordinated and dened security test plan. To date no such plan has been released or reported on. In fact the security deployment has been kept condential. In a system that reects a security based services oriented architecture, the necessity to test the individual components and the integrated end-to-end system is vital. Whilst the underpinning of the system and its reliance on standards will provide some assurance, what is untested is the varia- 
